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I. Abstract 
Many professions require successfully completing examinations before allowing 
individuals to practice. These examinations are often administrated by organizations 
consisting of individuals currently practicing that profession. Some examples of these 
organizations are the American Bar Association, the Society of Actuaries and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The public motive behind these 
examinations is to maintain a high level of competence in order to ensure public 
confidence. A possible alternative explanation for these examinations is that they erect 
an entrance barrier which leads to higher incomes for those already practicing these 
professions. In this paper, I am first going to compare the details and stated purposes of 
each of these examinations. Next, I am going to study the effects these examinations 
have on the supply of labor, income levels and other available economic data. Finally, I 
will examine how such economic variables are affected by the differential structures of 
these entrance examinations. 
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II. Introduction 
A. Reasons for Professional Regulation 
Civilizations have advanced greatly over the recent 50 centuries. When humanity 
started, we had to spend every waking minute scraping for food and shelter with our primitive 
stone tools. Over the years, we have gotten much better at surviving; many would say we have 
even come to flourish. These days, most people in the United States have absolutely no hand in 
the production of food. Today our tools are so miraculous; most people cannot fully understand 
them. Many people know how to use a personal computer, but only the smallest portion of our 
population could actually build one. This illustrates one of the key tools of advancement for 
civilization: specialization. 
One single person may be able to live off the land, but he would never be able to have the 
amount of leisure time or enjoyable amenities that we have today. This is because one person 
cannot be exceptional at doing everything himself. It is also true that he would not have access 
to all the wonderful technology we have now, and even if he did have access, it is unlikely he 
would know how to use it all. We gain our leisure time because everyone in society specializes 
to produce society's needs. 
It is easy to see how specialization began by looking at an early profession such as a 
blacksmith. The jobs a village blacksmith would perform would be very difficult if not 
impossible for another member of the village to replicate. Therefore, the other villagers would 
be willing to trade for the blacksmith's services. A blacksmith would gladly accept an exchange 
of some kind to satisfy his basic needs. If the blacksmith never has to worry about producing his 
4 
own food and can spend all of his time working with metal, then he will just continue to become 
better and more proficient. This is a very mutually beneficial relationship. 
In modern days we do not have many blacksmiths, but we do still have a great deal of 
specialization. In fact, it is astounding the numbers of professions a young person could enter 
into today. My research is focused on three of these professions: actuaries, lawyers and 
accountants. Lawyers and accountants are common enough for most people to grasp what 
services they provide. Actuaries are less well known. Basically, they are mathematicians who 
price insurance. Actuaries often prefer to be known as strong businesspeople with the ability to 
numerically evaluate risk. 
These professions can be compares to the blacksmith example. All four of these jobs, 
actuaries, lawyers, accountants and blacksmiths, came from a rather advanced application of 
specialization. It takes advanced study and understanding to be able to perform the services all 
of these professions provide. It is not easy to work metal, price insurance, understand and apply 
laws, or to keep a precise measurement of the movement of money. However, it is quite a 
different matter to be able to tell if one of these professionals did their job correctly. Let us look 
at each of the mentioned professions individually with regard to customer satisfaction and how it 
holds the professionals responsible. 
The village blacksmith was generally a well known person in the community. 
Oftentimes, he was also well respected, but that depended on his quality of work. When a farmer 
purchased a plow blade from the blacksmith, he would not immediately know the quality of the 
plow. As the farmer used the plow blade though, he would be able to make a very accurate 
judgment of the plow blade. If the work on the blade was poor, it would quickly dull or snap and 
leave a very unhappy farmer. The farmer would then go back to the same blacksmith and 
5 
demand compensation of some manner, or at the very least, he would offer the blacksmith much 
less money for his next plow blade. Then in addition to confronting the blacksmith, he would 
quickly tell his plight to all the other villagers. The other villagers might dismiss one or two bad 
plow blades, but if multiple villagers had problems, then the blacksmith would very quickly lose 
credibility. 
This logical chain of events keeps the blacksmith on a straight and narrow path. He must 
produce quality products and charge reasonable prices, otherwise the villagers would become 
unsatisfied and it would become easy for another blacksmith to move in and take over his 
business. There are a few key links in this chain that binds our blacksmith though. First, it was 
possible for the farmer to know that he received a bad plow blade. For example, if all the 
villagers inside one town have only ever purchased plow blades from the same blacksmith, they 
may not be able to tell a good plow blade from a bad plow blade. If any of the villagers had ever 
lived elsewhere though, the fraudulent blacksmith would quickly be exposed. 
Another, more important, way this may occur would be if a villager purchased a product 
completely new to him. If so, then he does not know what to look for as far as quality in this 
new product. A villager who purchased a poor sword is a perfect example of an uninformed 
consumer. It is quite likely that the blacksmith knew it was a poor sword, but he might have felt 
no remorse in selling it to the villager. From the blacksmith's point of view he knows that the 
peaceful villager would pay the same price for a quality weapon as he would for a poor replica. 
The blacksmith also realized it would take much less of his time to throw together the cheap 
sword, so he would be making a much larger profit. It may be pointed out that the blacksmith 
should have a moral obligation to provide a quality sword, after all, what if the villager needed 
it? However, it is quite possible that the blacksmith knows the villager never plans on using the 
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sword. The blacksmith probably just sees the peaceful villager as paying for peace of mind 
instead of for true physical protection. 
A modem day equivalent could be a lawyer writing a will. There is a fine art to writing a 
will to make sure that each of your descendent receives the proportion of wealth that you desire 
them to. Your average citizen could not write a good will, nor could he tell if a will he 
purchased is legally solid either. He has to put his trust into a lawyer to translate his true desires 
into writing. 
In parallel to the poorly wrought sword though, how easy is it to recognize a poorly 
written will? Very seldom is a will ever contested or scrutinized over by common citizens. It is 
often just purchased, drafted, and then placed in some obscure security deposit box. Even on the 
rare occurrence when an elderly parent passes away and the remaining children squabble in court 
over the estate, the lawyer who wrote the will is likely long passed away as well. An old lawyer 
does not need to worry much about the repercussions of his actions, especially since his customer 
is deceased. A professional examination given to the old lawyer at the beginning of his career 
might have very little impact on his actions at the end of his career, especially if the examination 
only tested his knowledge of the law. Many of the examinations now also have a large section 
on moral obligation. They try to instill a sense of integrity into the young professionals. The 
squabbling children who suffer from the bad will might become capable of distinguishing a good 
will from a bad will, but it is not really a skill to pass on to their children or to discuss at the 
coffee shop. So in regards to purchasing wills, most of the customers are going to be 
uninformed. 
In fact, most citizens do not discuss their satisfaction with any professional services 
when they are in casual conversation with their friends. In the days of a village blacksmith, the 
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whole town would quickly know after the blacksmith produced many faulty products. For a 
lawyer in a big city though, he does not have to worry about word of mouth. and very little of his 
business even comes from word of mouth. This is related to the other fact that most of these 
professionals work on one time business. It might be common to visit a tax accountant every 
year, but many people just use financial advisors as one time consultants to plan their lives all the 
way through retirement. Lawyers in particular do not generally help people draft more than one 
will or settle more than one divorce case. 
All of these reasons contribute to the need to regulate these professions. The village 
blacksmith was kept in check and held accountable for his actions without any government 
intervention. These highly educated professionals of today do not have the same inherent 
constraints built into them. Therefore. governments often step in and perform some sort of 
regulation on these professions. Or sometimes the professions regulate themselves so that they 
can keep up a reputable image with the public and their potential customers. 
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B. Problems with Professional Regulation 
Although the above arguments for professional examinations seem logical, many of them 
do not hold up under closer scrutiny. The biggest assumption from above might be that all 
modem consumers are uninformed about a lot of the products they are purchasing. While it is 
true that there is so much specialization today, it is not impossible for a consumer to still learn 
about a product before he purchases it. There are plenty of magazines like Consumer Guide or 
an even larger abundance of information available over the internet. Another flaw in the 
uninformed consumer argument is just who the consumers are. When an insurance policy is 
purchased, the money does not go straight to the actuary; it goes through the insurance company 
first. When focus is placed on the labor market, it is easy to see that the real consumers for these 
professionals are the companies that higher them, not the public that purchases their products. 
These companies are always extremely knowledgeable about what they want too. They are not 
uninformed about qualities to look for in a professional. In reality, there really are not many 
uninformed consumers for professional examinations to protect. 
Even in the few cases where there is an uninformed consumer, such as a small town 
independent lawyer writing a will, the examinations have no way of protecting the consumer. 
These professionals only have to pass the entry examinations once when they begin. The 
examinations provide no incentive for a practicing professional to stay current on his knowledge 
base. He has already passed the examination and views his time spent on it as a sunk cost, it is 
over and done with. The examinations can try to instill a moral obligation to perform credible 
work, but it is still the individual professional that has to follow through with it. For an elder 
professional close to requirement, the often forgotten examinations provide no real incentive to 
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chum out quality work anymore. The examinations really do not work well at protecting the 
consumers. The reasons given could be seen as rationalizations. 
Even accepting that there are questionable reasons for professional regulation, as soon as 
regulation takes place other problems arise. The most problems seem to appear when 
professionals are regulated by themselves for their own private interests. Private interests are 
really the driving force of most the problems professional regulations face. It can be assumed 
that most individuals are driven to maximize their wealth. One way for them to acquire more 
stuff would be to make more money then everyone else is making. So a professional wants to 
have a higher than normal salary. Maybe more precisely, the professional actually wants a salary 
that grows faster than anyone else's salary. This way he will be accumulating a larger portion of 
the stuff available. There are many ways they can accomplish this. 
The labor market can be expressed as a simple set of supply and demand curves. Inside 
this market, the consumers who generate the demand curve are actually the companies that wish 
to hire new employees. The suppliers that make up the supply curve are actually the workers. 
They are the ones that are offering themselves up for labor. These curves intersect somewhere at 
an equilibrium and that is the salary that is agreed upon inside that labor market. Some laborers 
will not work for that salary and remain unemployed. 
In the case of professional regulations through private interests, the professionals already 
working in the field can actually affect the supply of new laborers. One way they can do this is 
through some manner of examination. If someone has to pass an examination before they can 
work in this certain profession, and the examination is very difficult, it is likely that many 
candidates will not pass. Since these candidates are being turned away, there will be a shortage 
in the supply of new professionals inside the field. 
10 
If the supply of laborers is decreased, then using simple supply and demand, it is easy to 
see that the new equilibrium salary will be increased. Through the administration of an 
examination, the professionals inside the field have managed to increase their own salary. It 
would be like stifling your competition before they ever got a chance to compete. From a simple 
supply and demand model, it can be seen that in addition to increasing wages, the level of 
employment will be smaller than usual as well. If a profession has an entry examination, it is 
likely that the number of professionals is lower than it would otherwise be. 
If the companies have to pay these higher salaries to these professionals, then they will 
just pass on some their higher costs to their customers. If the customers actually realized what 
was going on, they would be outraged. It is actually very unlikely they will ever notice for a 
couple reasons though. First, most regulated professions are very small. At the same time, their 
customer base can be extremely large. Almost all Americans have some form of insurance, but 
there are a very small number of actuaries who price it. The public as a whole is ignorant of the 
situation because the increase in cost to them as a whole is very smalL It would be like each and 
every American paying one extra penny per day to the pocket of some unknown person sitting 
somewhere they cannot see. It is unlikely they will realize they are even being charged for the 
costs of the professionals' educations, and yet the person in the dark office is getting rich very 
quickly. 
It is important to note that any form of barrier to entry on a profession will create this 
income effect. It is entirely possible that these groups of professionals are taking money from 
the public completely inadvertently. They think there are real reasons they should be regulating 
their new professionals. Some of these professionals could have only the best intentions in mind. 
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That would not change the results of their actions though. Barriers to entry such as examinations 
still have a very good chance of driving up prices and salaries. 
Another problem would be overtraining of professionals. If the examinations are really a 
lot tougher than they need to be just to limit competition, you could be overtraining the incoming 
employees. If the professional has invested so much of his time into becoming a master of his 
field just to pass the examinations, then any work assigned to him or her that is on a lower level 
than he or she is trained for would be a waste of money. At the same time, the work they are 
doing must be done by someone that has passed the examinations due to licensing restrictions. 
For example, with actuarial examinations students are often working while they take the 
examinations. The company they work for gives them needed supplies and more importantly 
time at work to study for these examinations. This is time at work that the company is just 
giving to these students. With the supply of actuaries being choked though, the companies have 
to give study time at work to attract the diminished supply of actuarial students that remain. 
They are losing money while the students are studying. To make up for the lost money, the 
companies again charge their customers higher prices. This might be justifiable if the studying 
led to a greatly increased productivity in the student in years to come. If the student is being 
tested on more than he needs to know to perform his job though, then these higher prices are 
being charged for no reason. Thus they are wasting the public's money. 
These are some of the reasons professional examinations exist, as well as some of the 
problems inherent in them. Next, I will explore some of the details surrounding the chosen 
professional examinations. 
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III. Entry Barriers 
A. Types of Entry Barriers 
There are many kinds of barriers to entry in professions. In a capitalist society, 
everyone is out to get ahead. Fore example, some professions, like children's dance 
teachers, require for you to start your own business to practice the profession. An entry 
barrier that can easily arise here is difficulty in obtaining banking credit for a business 
loan. Many specific business loans are only given out by a select number of banks to 
only the best applicants. Nicola Cetorelli and Philip Strahan study how this lack of 
competition in banking can even effect non-banking professions (Cetorelli 2004). For a 
look at how limited bank competition can erect entry barriers in fledgling economies, 
Cevdet Denizer has studied the effects limited loan able funds has had in Turkey (Denizer 
1999). 
Many times the government steps in and helps erect entry barriers. One way they 
do this is by giving out patents. If one business has a patent on a product they can 
explicitly close down any competition that arises. Drug companies are a classic case of 
this. A recent article by Henry Grabowski and John Vernon explores the effects a recent 
law has had on easing entry barriers for generic drugs (Grabowski 1995). Patents need to 
be renewed if possible though, and sometimes copycat businesses will keep a close eye 
on a patent holder when the renewal time is near. For the patent holder, it then becomes 
difficult to tell if it is worthwhile to renew the patent when they feel they already have 
claimed all of their profit they feel they can attain. A game of cat and mouse arises and is 
explored in an article by Corrine Langinier (Langinier 2004). 
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Government regulation can have many complications with its construction and 
execution. The government can not be a completely impartial group who makes 
decisions just to protect the consumer. There will always be special interest groups 
applying pressure, along with many other sources. Antonio Estache and David Martimort 
study some of the options to building the governmental regulating bodies. They explain 
that although professional experts would be very knowledgeable in their field, they would 
also be likely to return to practice, and thus wish to preserve the profession'S income for 
when they return. They conclude that elected public officials would be unlikely to be any 
better since they will still face pressure from outside sources, and they will not even 
understand the profession they are regulating enough to see the consequences of their 
choices (Estache 1999). There are many problems with government regulation, but they 
are not the only group that can enforce entry barriers. 
Companies that have monopolies in multiple markets can exercise some unique 
entry barriers. Bundling their products together is one entry barrier often overlooked. 
Proctor and Gamble is a huge household goods producer that can offer discount for 
buying toothbrushes and hand soap together. Barry Nalebuff explored many of the 
repercussions of using bundling as a barrier to entry. One of his insightful findings was 
that even though consumers benefit from the reduced price for the bundle, they are hurt 
much more by the stifling of competition. The companies are making great economic 
profit with their entry deterrent (Nalebuff 2004). Another study by Richard Gilbert and 
Carmen Matutes focuses on how multiproduct companies try to stifle competition by 
brand proliferation (Gilbert 1990). 
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B. Examinations as Entry Barriers 
For many professions, entry barriers take the form of professional licensing. 
Morris Kleiner and Robert Kudrle explore the effects licensing has on the dentist 
profession in the United States. They explore the impact different state requirements 
have on the number of new professionals in each state. In their results, they claim to have 
evidence that stricter licensing provisions in a state deter new dentists from working in 
that state (Kleiner 1992). 
Johnathon Guryan and Joshua Angrist did a study on how forcing public school 
teachers to pass state administered entry examinations affected the salary of public school 
teachers and the quality of public school teachers. They proposed that as an entry barrier, 
the testing would raise salaries, but also affect the quality of teachers. They felt that the 
tests would eliminate those under qualified to teach, but would also cause some of the 
best qualified teachers to go to private schools where they would not be bothered by the 
examinations. Therefore, they felt that although the salaries would go up, the quality of 
teachers would remain about the same. Their findings seem to support their claims 
(Angrist 2003). 
There have been other studies that focused on relating incomes to admittance rates 
when professional examinations were involved. Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca 
Fiorentini did an extensive study of Italian accountants. First they compared the 
accounting profession to two other professions in Italy to show how it used examinations 
as barriers to entry. Then they used data to show the effects self regulation has on the 
existing accountants' behavior. They found evidence that admittance rates were actually 
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based on prior income levels, implying that the existing accountants tried to boost their 
lagging incomes by choking competition (Bortolotti 1997). 
Another article by John Hood shows how entry barriers can ultimately hurt 
consumers. Many other people only concentrate on the effects on professionals in the 
industry. John Hood explains what happens to the end product consumers. He explores 
how these entry barriers can be intended to actually protect the consumer. In the end 
though, he concludes by showing the effects to consumers in the areas of both prices and 
quality (Hood 1992). 
An all encompassing article on barriers to entry was written by Nuno Garoupa. 
He studied entry barriers on lawyers and physicians across almost all of western 
civilization. He starts by explaining why the barriers exist, and then goes into detail 
about how they were enforced. It is interesting to see how different kinds of groups 
emerge to enforce these barrier entries. I am focusing on private interests, but these 
private groups can often hide under the wing of an ignorant government. From here, he 
talks about the different distinct types of barriers to entry and how these affect his chosen 
professions. One idea in particular I used from Garoupa was the hypothesis that if a 
profession is being restricted by entry barriers, then it should have a comparatively low 
level of unemployment. Garoupa went on to test his theories, and in particular tried to 
analyze government law in his chosen regions. He concluded that the United States, 
Norway, the United Kingdom and Belgium provide efficient regulation, while Germany, 
Austria and Portugal perform badly for both legal and medical professions (Garoupa 
2004). 
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IV. Examinations 
A. Actuarial Examinations 
Three examinations in particular are going to be studied: the actuarial exams, the 
Multistate Bar Examination and the Certified Public Accountant examinations. All of 
these exams have similarities and differences, but each one servers as an entry barrier for 
its profession. It is very difficult to practice in any of these professions without passing 
these entrance examinations first. 
The first to be explored will be the actuarial exams. These exams are given 
jointly by the Society of Actuaries, also known as the SOA, and the Casualty Actuarial 
Society, also known as the CAS, inside of the United States. The actual exam structure 
does change every four years on average, but many aspects of the exam stay the same. 
There are a series of five to ten examinations that are given usually once or twice per 
year. The content generally does not vary greatly when the exam structure is changed. 
The first half of the examinations the SOA and the CAS give jointly and test the same 
material. In the later examinations, the SOA tests detail health and life insurance topics 
while the CAS concentrates on auto, or general property and casualty insurance. 
Most of the examinations are forty multiple choice questions. Some of the later 
exams take the form of a seminar or more written work. The scoring of these exams 
could be considered very peculiar to an outsider. When a candidate is given back his 
score, he is given a number from one to ten. Any number from six and above means he 
passed, and anything five or less means he failed. 
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The oddest characteristic of the scoring is that for the multiple choice exams, the 
number of correct answers to attain a score of six, a passing score, varies from year to 
year. One year it may mean you need to answer 36 correct to pass, and the next only 30. 
The examination committee that determines the score explains their reasoning. They 
explore each question and determine how applicable it was and how necessary it be that 
the candidate answers it correctly. This way they can score each question individually 
and then try and set a level to which they want to hold the candidates. With this 
reasoning, it is easy to see why the passing ratios fluctuate from year to year for these 
exams. It makes it at least appear to the candidates though that they are competing with 
each other. If the candidates never know what the pass ratio is or how each question is 
weighted, then it really drives home a need to get in the highest percentiles and out score 
all of the competition. This can lead to students studying every obscure fact, hoping it 
will be asked and they can answer it, giving them a slim edge over the competition. 
If the examination committee is honest in their reasoning behind scoring the 
examinations, then it is doubtful that they consciously control the supply of new actuaries 
to affect their incomes. It is entirely possible that they do this inadvertently though. If 
they do not pass many candidates for awhile, it is likely their own incomes will rise as a 
result. If this occurs, then it easily shows how damaging the examination is as an entry 
barrier to consumers. The consumers are going to be the ones that have to pay the higher 
salaries. 
Also, it has often been argued that these exams test more knowledge than is 
needed to perform the duties of an actuary. It is also true that companies that employ 
actuaries often give their students paid time at work to study. This means that if these 
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students are studying useless knowledge on company hours, then the company is going to 
lose money. To make up the money, they will pass some of the cost onto their customers. 
This is another way the consumers will be hurt. 
B. CPA Examinations 
The next professional examination is the Certified Public Accountant 
examination. It is a very standardized test given to anyone that wants to become a 
professional accountant. The exam is available to be taken two months every season. 
Therefore, there are many opportunities to sit for this examination. There are four parts 
to it, and they may be taken all at once or at separate sittings as long as they are 
completed in a timely manner. Once you pass all of these exams you are then able to 
sign your name to many taxation calculations and general bookkeeping ledges as a 
Certified Public Accountant. 
The most interesting development with the CPA exam is its recent transformation 
to a computer based testing system. It is the first professional examination examined to 
have done this. The CPA exam did this for many reasons. First, they did it so that the 
testing would more closely resemble the work a real accountant would do. They use the 
computer to simulate real accounting software and problems during the examination. It 
also forces all new accountants to have at least some computer familiarity. Before this, 
some accountants were qualified with a CPA exam, but incapable of working due to 
computer incompetence. 
The greatest advancement with the computer based testing is the inclusion of 
adaptive features. The computer system stores a vast array of possible questions. It 
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groups these into small sets of twenty questions with a consistent difficulty level. This 
means it has many sets of easy questions, medium questions, hard questions, and blended 
sets in-between. Each candidate begins the exam with a set of moderate difficulty 
questions. Depending on their performance on these questions, the next set offered to 
them may be more difficult or easier than their prior set. This continues with the next set 
and helps narrow down the candidate's true capabilities. 
These adaptive features are only available on a computer based system since you 
have to have the immediate results of the first question set to decide what questions to 
give next. This gives a much more accurate score for the candidate than the traditional 
one set of questions. The exam committee that used to have to worry about scoring the 
exam as a whole, now just needs to continually audit their question pool and keep 
appropriate questions in each of the question pools. 
C. BAR Examinations 
The last professional examination is the Multi-State Bar Examination. This is the 
most common examination given to aspiring lawyers before there are allowed to practice 
law inside the United States. This examination is unique in the manner it is administrated 
and scored. There is a central, national body that both administrates the bar examination 
and then calculates an adjusted score for every candidate. The adjusted scores are all just 
normalized raw scores so that the adjusted scores will be comparable from year to year. 
This is very similar to what the Society of Actuaries does, in that neither really releases a 
raw score. It would seem that both examinations could be skewed by an exceptionally 
smart or dumb set of candidates in a particular year. Also, it would seem that it would be 
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-easy to adjust the reported scores for the committee's own purposes without drawing 
attention to it. 
A big difference between the bar examination and the others comes with how the 
scores are treated. Even though there is a national board that sets the scores, each 
individual state that decides to use the bar examination then sets their own passing scores. 
They al1 do it by different means, and not all of these are released. Some of the just set a 
given passing score, and others just set a given passing rate. There is a wide variety in 
the way these national scores are handled by the individual states. 
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V. Hypothesis 
A. Model Used 
F or the hypotheses, a simple supply and demand model of labor will be used. 
Relationships will be hypothesized, and then they will be tested by choosing indicators to 
look for in real data. The labor market model will just be a simple one, lacking 
expectations and delays of price realization. The horizontal axis will represent the 
quantity of laborers employed, and the vertical axis will represent the income level of 
these laborers. There will only be a supply curve, formed by the aspiring students 
looking to enter each of these professions, and a demand curve, formed by the businesses 
looking for new hires. 
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If the supply of new students expands, then quantity of employment will rise and 
incomes will fall. 
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If the supply recedes, then the quantity will fall and income will rise. 
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-If the demand for students expands, then both income and employment quantity 
will rise. 
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If the demand for students recedes, then both income and employment quantity 
will fall. 
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For a more detailed explanation of modern labor market models a good book to 
read would be Labor Economics by George J. Borjas. 
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B. Relationships Explored 
There are many ways these professional examinations will affect this model. The 
people who control these examinations are best represented by the current supply of 
professionals already working in their respective field. These established professionals 
have their own interests driving them, the primary of which in a capitalist society is to 
maximize income. They would want to see the supply of professionals shrink, or at least 
grow less rapidly then it would otherwise. This would drive their income growth up. 
These professional examinations serve as a barrier to entry. Inside the model, 
they serve to limit the supply of professionals. In limiting supply, they should lower the 
quantity of employed professionals and raise their incomes. To be technical, they should 
lower the growth of quantity and raise their income growth. The more limiting the 
examination, via a lower passing rate, the larger the effect on the supply curve should be. 
This relationship will be tested by collecting data and then comparing changes in pass 
rates to future changes in incomes. If this is really occurring, then when a professional 
examination is significantly harder one year than the prior causing a pass rate decline, 
then employed professionals' incomes should rise faster than usual in the near future. 
In the above relationship, pass rates affected future incomes. There could be a 
reverse causation though. Since the ruling bodies of these examinations are employed 
professionals, they could try and control their own future incomes by controlling their 
own supply curve. A lower than average income growth would prompt them to hold 
back the supply curve by lowering the pass ratio in the near future. This would be a 
result of the current professionals trying to boost their future incomes at the expense of 
the aspiring candidates. They would be purposefully shrinking back the supply curve. 
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The same data will be used for this test, but will be explored for a time lag in the other 
direction and reverse causation from before. 
The last relationship is just a more general test to see how large of an impact 
professional examinations have on these professions as a whole. This will be done to try 
and see if they actually affect employment growth just by existing. To test this, 
employment numbers from inside each profession will be obtained and then compared to 
general employment numbers of closely related professions. It would seem logical that 
closely related professions, such as lawyers and paralegals, should have a very similar 
growth in employment over time. If the lawyers are lagging behind in their growth, then 
it would signify that the professional examinations are having a large impact on the 
individual professions. 
26 
VI. Data 
A. Pass Rate Data 
The first data obtained was the examination pass rate data. The BAR exam data 
turned out to be extremely easy to acquire. It maintains a nice website with information 
on the examination and easy links leading to downloadable documents containing the 
data. They had data as far back as the 1980's and all of it was split up by state and year. 
This afforded me a great many data points for the bar exam pass rates. 
The next data was the pass rate data from the Society of Actuaries. They do have 
a flashy website, but it is rather unhelpful. The website only listed the last two years total 
pass rates. The available Society of Actuaries data did not extend back any further. 
Luckily, there is also the Casualty Actuarial Society. This is a sister society that shares 
the same first four exams as the Society of Actuaries. The CAS has fewer total members, 
but they still have a much better database of passing scores. They also gave data back 
into the 1980' s. Since the bulk of actuarial candidates are sitting for the first four exams 
every time, the data from the CAS should give a good representation of the pass rates as a 
whole. In fact, in the past five years, over 90% of the CAS candidates each year have 
been sitting for one of the first four exams that are shared by the CAS and SOA. Only 
10% or less of the pass rates will be any different between the societies. This should 
make credible data to use for actuarial pass rates in general. 
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Shared Actuarial Exams 
Years 
Shared Exam Takers 
CAS Only Exam Takers 
Percentage Shared 
2000-2004 
97,037 
9,111 
91.42% 
The last pass rate data was for the CPA exam. This turned out to be a very 
difficult process. They seem to be released only in a highly professional report that is 
then sold for a large amount of money to research institutions that deems it worthy to pay 
for them. Ball State only has a couple of these scattered through the years, so this was a 
very bad source of data. Attempts to contact the national organization that administers 
the CPA exam were met with no success. In the end, getting into contact with the 
professional licensing branch at the state capital in Indianapolis was the best approach. 
They had Indiana's passing rates leading back into the 1980's and they were willing to 
make copies of the data. A trip was made to the capital and the photocopies were 
obtained. At that point, it did not seem worthwhile to attempt to go to other state capitals 
and try and get similar pass rates from them. So for the CPA exam, only Indiana pass 
rate data was used. 
After the pass rate data was obtained, it was then processed into time series for 
each examination. The pass rate for each year was calculated to be the number of passing 
scores in that year divided by the number of examinations attempted. Then the 
logarithmic growth rates during each year were calculated. The end data for the actuaries 
and lawyers was at a national level and only Indiana data for the accountants. 
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B. Employment and Income Data 
The last source of data turned out to be very bountiful. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics turned out to have very extensive sources of data for both incomes and 
employment numbers. For most professions imaginable, they have both annual salary 
and employment numbers for all fifty states dating back to 1998. In addition, they even 
break the professional job market down into sectors, and then release the totals for each 
of these sectors. Lawyers fell under legal professions. Actuaries fell under mathematical 
computer related professions. Accountants fell under the financial markets sector. Using 
these broader sectors, sector growths relating to each of my individual professions was 
obtained. 
This data was also turned into time series composed of logarithmic growth rates 
for each individual profession and sector. This gave three time series for income and two 
sets of three times series for employment numbers. For the income numbers, national 
data for actuaries and lawyers and Indiana data for the accountants was used to match the 
pass rate data. 
On the whole, the data acquired was highly credible and accurate. It would have 
been nice to be able to acquire a state breakdown on the actuarial exams. It seems there 
might just not be a sufficient number of people taking the actuarial examinations to really 
mandate that sort of detail in their reporting. It also would have been nice if there was an 
easier way to obtain the CPA results for each of the states. The accounting boards 
seemed to be quite closed lipped about their results in the end. The fact they make a 
profit off of selling their results might make a difference in that matter. Lastly, the 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics data was a great source, if only a little lacking on the numbers 
of years available. 
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VI. Test Results 
A. Income Rates versus Passing Rates 
Two of the relationships involved comparing income growth rates versus passing 
rates. The test were done to see which caused which, or if they were unrelated. For this 
causation test, both variables were tested on a zero, one, and then two year delay to each 
other to see which relationship was the strongest. The right direction of causation was 
also checked for. If income growth rates affected future passing rates, there should be a 
positive relationship. If passing rates affected future income growth rates, there should 
be a negative relationship. 
First, the strongest results came from the actuarial examination tests. A very 
strong relationship between the change in pass rates and the change in incomes two years 
in the future was discovered. It was a negative relationship, as predicted, and the 
statistics were very significant. The only flaw is that there were only four data points in 
the end because of all the data processing required to create the coordinates tested. Only 
four data points means the results has less credibility, but the statistical significance of 
the results helps to balance this. 
CAS Pass Rates (x) Causing Income Growth Rates (y) 
National Level 
N 
R"2 
P-value 
Result 
2 Year Delay 
4 
0.9445 
0.0282 
y=.0359-.1763x 
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The next strongest relationships were the results from the CPA examination tests. 
An equal amount of data as above was used for this examination because only Indiana 
state level passing rates were acquired. After testing all the relationships between the 
changes in CPA pass rates and the change in accountants' incomes in Indiana, a similar 
conclusion as above was reached, but this on was not as mathematically sound. The 
relationship remained the same, a two year delay between the passing rates causing a 
change in income with a negative relationship. With this data set though, the stastical 
credibility of the results were negligable. Yet, of the tested relationships between these 
two time series, this was the strongest by far. These results would be meaningless on 
their own though. 
CPA Pass Rates (x) Causing Income Growth Rates (y) 
Indiana State Level 
N 
RA2 
P-value 
Result 
2 Year Delay 
4 
0.4312 
0.3434 
y=.0399-.0499x 
The last of the pass rate data was the Bar rate data. With this data, there was a 
much larger set of data points because state level data for both the pass rates and the 
incomes was available. This data was used to make large cross panel time series with 
many data points. Unfortunately, it did no good because there only trivial relationships 
were discovered. The best relationship was a small bit of reverse causation; the change in 
income seemed to be driving the change in the pass rates one year in the future. Not only 
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was the relationship weak, but it was also in the wrong direction according to my 
hypothesis. 
Lawyer Income Rates (x) Causing BAR Pass Rates (y) 
State Level 1 Year Delay 
N 248 
R"2 0.0428 
P-value 0.0010 
I Result y=.01S4-.1949x 
These same tests could have been done on each of the fifty states individually, but 
that is statistically unwise to do. If a particular relationship is being sought in a large data 
set broken down into smaller sets, it becomes very likely that the relationship will appear 
out of sheer randomness. Put another way, if it is assumed all the data for all the states 
was completely unrelated and random then there is still a good chance any relationship 
that is sought after will appear in one of the states. Even supporting results were found, 
they would be easily discredited. 
B. Individual Profession versus Sector Growth Rates 
With all of these data sets, a nice large sample size was used due to the 
extensiveness of the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Again a cross sector time series that 
included data for all of the states was made. The professional sector data was already 
subdivided and was also made into a time series. Unfortunately, these results did not 
support the hypothesis of professional examinations choking employment growth relative 
to general sector growth. 
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First, the accountants were the only profession to grow at any rate less than their 
similar professions. Even then, their growth rate was still very close to their sector's 
growth rate. 
Accounting Growth to General Financial Growth 
N 
Avg Accounting 
Avg Financial 
269 
2.53% 
2.98% 
The lawyers were very close to everyone else in their sector as well. Unlike the 
accountants though, their growth rate was slightly larger than the growth rate of other 
legal professions. 
Lawyer Growth to General Legal Growth 
N 254 
Avg Lawyer 
Avg Legal 
2.74% 
2.44% 
The last profession was the actuarial profession compared to other mathematics 
jobs involving computers. This relationship turned out to be completely opposite than 
expected. The average employment growth of actuaries is much larger than anyone else 
in their sector. 
Actuarial Growth to General Mathematics 
Growth 
! N 143 
Avg Actuarial 
Avg Mathematical 
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3.95% 
1.52% 
C. Other Results 
The only other trend that stood enough to get noticed had to do with the 
computerized CPA examination. The computerized CPA examinations have only been 
given during 2004. As discussed before, they added many attractive improvements to try 
and increase its accuracy and applicability. Unfortunately, it appears that aspiring 
accountants in Indiana are horrible at computerized examinations. The results for 2004 
are below. 
Computerized CPA Exams 
Year 
Taken 
Passed 
Rate 
2004 
1459 
123 
8.43% 
To give something to compare these results against, here are the aggregate results 
for all of the pencil and paper examinations. 
Paper and Pencil CPA Exams 
Years 1998-2003 
Taken 11411 
Passed 2062 
Rate 18.07% 
For the mathematical analysts out there, the pencil and paper results really did not 
vary much from year to year. In fact, 1999 had the lowest results of any year, and they 
were still no where near as bad as the one year of computerized testing. 
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I Lowest Pencil and Paper Results 
Year 1999 
Taken 3087 
Passed 438 
Rate 14.19% 
It is easy to see that the one year of computerized examinations resulted in a much 
lower pass rate than would ever be expected given the years of pencil and paper exams. 
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VII. Conclusion 
A. Income Rates versus Passing Rates 
After looking at the results of the analysis, it appears passing rates affect income 
rates. In none of the professions was there any proof that income rates caused changes in 
passing rates. This means it seems unlikely that the examination boards are tightening up 
pass rates when they feel that their incomes growth is lower than it was the previous year. 
On the other hand though, there was some very strong proof that the examinations were 
acting as strong entry barriers in some of the professions. 
In particular, the Society of Actuaries seems to be directly affecting their own 
income growth by their choice of pass rates. If anyone on the board realized the extreme 
control they had over their own income growth, then there would be a great moral hazard 
to at least smooth out their income growth, or just make it skyrocket for the few years 
until they retire. On the other hand, the members could realize what power they have, but 
are outstanding public citizens who are satisfied with what they have and are only 
worried about the quality of actuaries they produce. Even if this were the case though, it 
would seem that they are over tightening their quality control since they are so strongly 
affecting the supply of new actuaries. 
For the CPA examination, the results were mathematically insignificant. It is 
interesting to note that the strongest of the insignificant trends was exactly the same as 
the trend for the actuarial examination. It was the same relationship that said increases in 
passing rates cause decreases in income growth two years later. This seems to at least 
add a little more credibility to the actuarial results since the same relationship surfaced in 
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both cases. It was interesting to find no mathematically significant relationship between 
the CPA exam pass rates and accountants' incomes though. With pass rates so low at 
times, it would seem that the professional examinations would have to have some impact 
on the labor market. There just might be some other factor that has an even larger impact 
and covers up any effect the pass rates might have had. 
The other interesting results from studying the CPA examination data was not the 
regression results, but the manner in which the data had to be obtained. The examination 
board seems to keep a tight reign on their results. In fact, they seem to be trying to make 
a profit off of the results. It does beg the question of are they actually trying to profit 
from the results, or are they just trying to keep their students in the dark as to how 
effective the examination is as an entry barrier. 
The last examination was the BAR examination. No relationship between the 
income growth rates and the passing rates seemed to exist. The unique structure of this 
examination was likely the main cause of the inconclusive results. Even though there is a 
singular national examination committee that sets the scores, it is up to each individual 
state licensing office to choose what they will accept as a passing score. The results 
could have been inconclusive because not all of the state offices act in similar manner. 
There are probably highly credible offices that just set a certain passing score, others that 
set a passing rate, and others who are actually going after their own income growth. 
Those that just set passing scores seem to be the most credible they seem to be actually 
concerned about the quality of candidate. The others that set a given pass rate are 
obviously using the examination as a pure barrier to entry. These people only want to let 
a certain percentage in to the profession, no matter how large the field is. It is just very 
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difficult to identify the other's motives since there are so many states out there that do not 
set passing rates or scores. 
It does appear from these results that at least the actuarial examinations serve as 
effective entry barriers. The CPA examinations do not seem to have a strong effect on 
accountants' incomes. The BAR examination seems to have different effects depending 
on the state looked at. In none of the data was there any proof that the examination 
committees based the pass rates on their own income growth. 
B. Individual Profession versus Sector Growth Results 
The hypothesis on employment growth choking appears to have been disproved. 
The hypothesis was that employment growth in related professions should be similar, but 
those with entry barriers should be lower than the others. None of the professions 
examined seem to be lagging behind the rest of their professional sector in terms of 
employment growth. It seems that these results claim that examinations as entry barriers 
do not have a strong effect on relative employment growth. After looking at the results, it 
could instead be hypothesized that the relative growth rate differential is due more to job 
desirability. Here could be an explanation for the result using this rationalization. 
The lawyers seemed to be growing at an equal rate with all the other legal 
professions. This could be because younger people see being a lawyer and being a 
paralegal as equally desirable. A lawyer may make more money, but the costs in terms of 
time and study make other options equally desirable. 
The accountants were the only profession to lag behind their other financial sector 
growth rates. The lack of desirability could be blamed on social views and possible 
39 
misconceptions about accountants. Hollywood in particular really portrays it as an 
undesirable job. At the same time, other similar jobs such as stock traders and financial 
advisors in particular have seemed to get a recent push. This would indicate that being an 
accountant is less desirable than other financial jobs. 
The actuaries showed an above average growth rate compared to other 
mathematical computer jobs. This can be explained easily by the recent inclusion of 
actuary into many top job lists in the recent years. It tends to make the top of the lists due 
to the income level, job reliability, and low stress level. It is true many people still have 
no idea of what an actuary is, but those same people also would not know what the other 
jobs were that involved mathematics. Of those people interested in a mathematical 
computer based job, being an actuary is easily one of the most desirable jobs. 
This is the only possible reason the growth rates related the way they did. It is 
just a plausible relationship that supports the data examined. It is generally a bad idea to 
find relationships and then try and explain them though, so the above desirability 
argument should be seen solely as a new hypothesis. The old hypothesis on employment 
growth choking was still disproved. 
C. Other Results 
The last thing to discuss is the horrible pass rates Hoosiers experienced on the 
computerized CPA examination. It is very easy to see that the pass rates were unusually 
low in all of 2004, the first year the computerized examinations were used. There are a 
couple possible explanations for this. It is important to remember that the pass rates are 
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nationally controlled with the CPA examination, unlike the BAR that has a state level 
component. 
First, it could be that the whole nation was given an unusually low pass rate for 
the first year of the computerized examination. If this was the case, it could mean the 
examination committee has decided to really tighten up and use the examination as an 
entry barrier. They could have multiple reasons to do so. The first one hypothesized 
before is that they are trying to increase their own incomes. The other more benign 
reason would be that they feel the results were actually that bad and that aspiring 
accountants just did not have the computer skills they needed. This could be caused by a 
national trend of bad teaching. The last could just be that the students were not used to 
the computerized examination. This seems unlikely though since they have had three 
times to sit for it in 2004 already, and the scores have not significantly risen. Regardless 
of the actual cause, if any of the above were true it would mean it was a national trend. 
The other option would be that only Indiana in particular scored so badly on the 
computerized examination. The national committee could have kept the national passing 
rate or passing score the same. If this were the case, it would mean that Hoosiers are 
substantially behind most of the other states with their computer skills. This seems 
equally likely, but both seem equally hard to prove. Whether the low scores were a 
national trend or just local to Indiana, it would take data from a large number of states to 
try and prove either case. This brings back up the suspicion that the CPA examination 
committee likes the idea of hiding the results from the public. Whatever the cause, it is 
still interesting to note how low the pass rates were for the computerized CPA 
examination in Indiana. 
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O. Future Research 
There are multiple directions future research could take in regards to this topic. 
First, there are ways the tests done here could be repeated with different data. One of the 
ways the causation tests could be done again is by comparing the pass rates to either an 
altered income data set or maybe an employment growth data set. For an altered income 
growth set, it might be favorable to calculate some measure of average growth and then 
remove that value from the income growth used in this research. This might give a better 
idea of when one year's income growth was actually better or worse than another year's. 
It would add a sense of relativity to the data. Some examples of measurements of 
average growth could be change in GOP, general inflation, or just the average income 
growth for each profession. 
Another, more data rich option might be to try and break down the state data for 
the BAR examinations. Instead of looking at each state individually, it could be 
rewarding to try and group the states together based on how they choose to pass 
candidates. The groups could consist of states that passed candidates based on their 
actual score, ones that passed the same percentage of candidates each year, and the others 
that do not show a discernable pattern. All the same tests as before could be ran on each 
group of states. 
E. Closing 
In closing, I feel that I fully explored the hypotheses I set out to test. I know I at 
least proved that the actuarial examinations are serving as strong entry barriers. 
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However, I did not prove that the examination committees were controlling their own 
income. The BAR examination was just too subdivided to give any solid results. The 
employment growth relationships did not pan out as I predicted. I was unable to use 
those results to add further evidence that the professional examinations were solid entry 
barriers. 
In the end, I feel much more knowledgeable about the subject. I especially like 
knowing that there do not seem to be evil examination committees out there striving to 
control their own incomes. I still do not like that some of the examinations seem to be 
such efficient entry barriers. Above all else though, I hope to just spread the facts I found 
and get other people interested in the subject. 
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